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—  No te  — 
Clearing the Judicial Fog: 
Codifying Abstention 
“It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it 
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it 
should. . . . With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case 
may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other 
would be treason to the constitution.” 
 
-Chief Justice John Marshall1 
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1. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 (6 Wheat.) U.S. 264, 404 (1821). 
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Introduction 
On November 24, 2014, a state official allegedly lied to the public, 
and the law barred those with knowledge from revealing the truth. 
Within six weeks, a whistleblower filed a federal complaint to challenge 
the state statute that silenced her and to vindicate her First Amend-
ment rights. She claimed that the November 24 statement of St. Louis 
County Prosecuting Attorney Robert P. McCulloch—describing a 
grand jury’s purportedly “collective” decision, based on all possible evi-
dence, not to indict Darren Wilson, the police officer who had shot and 
killed Michael Brown three months earlier in Ferguson, Missouri—was 
profoundly misleading and should be corrected with facts from the 
grand jurors themselves.2 Under the name “Grand Juror Doe,” she filed 
a complaint on January 5, 2015, in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that 
Missouri’s statute criminalizing a grand juror’s disclosure of the evi-
dence or proceedings violated the First Amendment.3 
To this day, the merits of this challenge to Missouri law have not 
been addressed except by an elected state judge. The federal district 
court, on May 5, 2015, decided to abstain from hearing the case, citing 
the so-called Pullman4 abstention doctrine as its justification.5 Grand 
Juror Doe appealed the decision, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the abstention on June 20, 2016.6 
Grand Juror Doe was forced to bring her action under the federal 
Constitution to Missouri state court, and the case was dismissed with 
prejudice on December 13, 2016.7 Almost exactly one year later, on 
December 12, 2017, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
 
2. Jeremy Kohler, Statement of St. Louis Prosecuting Attorney Robert P. 
McCulloch, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www. 
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/statement-of-st-louis-prosecuting-
attorney-robert-p-mcculloch/article_2becfef3-9b4b-5e1e-9043-f586f389ef91. 
html [https://perma.cc/GNY7-QU37]; Complaint for Prospective Relief at 
6, Doe v. McCulloch, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (No. 4:15-cv-
00006), 2015 WL 47623. 
3. Complaint for Prospective Relief, supra note 2, at 1, 9–10. 
4. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
5. Doe v. McCulloch, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1012–15 (E.D. Mo. 2015). 
6. Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2016). Grand Juror Doe 
successfully moved to proceed under a pseudonym in the district court. The 
Eighth Circuit followed suit by using feminine pronouns for Grand Juror 
Doe, and this Note does the same. Id. at 786 n.1. 
7. Doe v. McCulloch, No. 15SL-CC01891, 2016 WL 9000971, (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 
13, 2016), aff’d, No. ED 105181, 2017 WL 6327682, (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 
2017), motion for transfer to Supreme Court filed, No. SC96950 (Mo. Feb. 
13, 2018). 
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court’s dismissal.8 As of this writing, her motion for a transfer to the 
Supreme Court of Missouri is pending.9 
After exhausting her state-court appeals, pursuant to Pullman 
abstention and an England10 reservation, Grand Juror Doe may ulti-
mately return to the Eastern District of Missouri at the conclusion of 
all state court proceedings. This will occur no sooner than 2018, for a 
case that could have been decided three years prior. Potentially, 
Pullman abstention will have resulted in the chilling or silencing of con-
stitutionally protected speech for an extended period of time while 
Grand Juror Doe bore the expense of years of litigation before her day 
in federal court to decide a federal question about the scope of the First 
Amendment. 
Abstention is a collection of doctrines that largely create enormous 
waste and that overwhelm the perceived benefits of their implemen-
tation. Inefficiency in the judicial system leaves litigants with high 
transaction costs from added proceedings, extended delay in reaching a 
resolution, and a potentially elongated chilling effect on constitutional 
rights. Not only does abstention create unnecessary obstacles for liti-
gants, but this Note also argues that abstention is needlessly compli-
cated, leading to situations in which litigants are further burdened by 
judicial error. This Note proposes legislation to codify the entirety of 
abstention in federal courts so as to streamline judicial efficiency and 
promote clarity within the doctrines. 
Part I of this Note will examine the various abstention doctrines 
used in the United States. Part II will address the issues that arise from 
the use of these abstention doctrines. Part III will introduce potential 
solutions to the problems created by abstention, along with the possible 
consequences from adopting the solutions. Part IV will focus on the 
proposed abstention legislation, and how it can improve the judicial 
system.11 
I. Abstention in Federal Courts 
Abstention is not one specific doctrine, but a collection of common 
law doctrines addressing situations in which a federal court has juris-
diction over a case but decides not to exercise that jurisdiction. Courts 
 
8. Doe. v. McCulloch, No. ED 105181, 2017 WL 6327682, (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 
12, 2017). 
9. Application for Transfer to the Supreme Court, Doe v. McCulloch, No. 
SC96950 (Mo. Feb. 13, 2018). 
10. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
11. While this topic necessitates a discussion of both federal and state 
procedures, this Note aims to propose only federal legislation, and thus 
solutions are made from that perspective. 
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generally apply abstention to facilitate a stable relationship between 
state courts and their federal counterparts.12 This can sometimes take 
the form of an unclear issue of state law, a parallel proceeding in state 
court, or a complex state administrative structure, to name a few 
examples. 
Depending on which doctrine the court uses to justify its decision 
to abstain, the result is typically a stay of federal proceedings, although 
sometimes it can be outright dismissal. A stay is issued when there 
remains a federal interest aside from the state interest in the case, and 
the litigants are invited to continue in federal court at a later time if 
necessary. 
A. Pullman Abstention for Unclear State Law 
Pullman abstention was “[d]esigned to avoid federal-court error in 
deciding state-law questions antecedent to federal constitutional is-
sues.”13 This particular doctrine, which was created in the case of 
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company,14 generally allows 
a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction because of an unclear 
issue of state law as to which a particular resolution could render the 
federal issue moot.15 
At the time of the case, the Pullman Company manufactured sleep-
er cars that could be coupled to trains for overnight travel. Railroad 
companies would operate and staff the train generally, while the 
Pullman Company staffed and operated the sleeper cars under the gen-
eral control of the railroad companies where applicable.16 Employee po-
sitions at the Pullman Company were divided by race. African Ameri-
cans held the position of porter, while whites held the position of 
Pullman conductor. Some trains carried one sleeper car, while others 
carried two or more.17 In situations where a train had only one sleeper 
car, no Pullman conductor was utilized, and the porter would operate 
the Pullman car under the control of the train’s conductor.18 
 
12. See Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our Federalism in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will Always Be with Us—Get Over It!!, 
36 Creighton L. Rev. 375, 376 (2003) (“These abstention doctrines cases 
reflect complex considerations designed to avoid friction between federal and 
state courts.”). 
13. Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997). 
14. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
15. Id. at 501. 
16. Id. at 497–98. 
17. Id. at 497. 
18. Id. 
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The Texas Railroad Commission ruled that a Pullman conductor 
was necessary for the operation of a sleeper car, regardless of the num-
ber of sleeper cars on the train.19 The Pullman Company sued the Rail-
road Commission in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Texas, claiming the order violated both Texas law and the U.S. Consti-
tution. The porters intervened in the suit, and challenged the com-
mission’s order as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 
The three-judge district court noted that the commission had the 
power to pass regulations that would correct abuses.21 The district court 
then determined that the commission only had the power to correct an 
“abuse which has been defined by the law.”22 The court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs on the grounds that the commission lacked the author-
ity for its order; the court did not address any other issues.23 
Citing a desire to avoid ruling on the sensitive constitutional issue 
of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court stated that the case must 
be viewed solely through the lens of Texas law.24 Instead of actually 
grappling with state law, however, the Court announced that the Texas 
Supreme Court should hold the final word on the meaning of the Texas 
statute.25 Although the Court noted the district court judges’ experience 
with Texas law, it also characterized the Court as “outsiders without 
special competence in Texas law,” and stated its lack of confidence in 
any decision it could render on the issue.26 
In carving out Pullman abstention, the Court stated: 
In this situation a federal court of equity is asked to decide an 
issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced 
 
19. Id. at 497–98. 
20. Id. at 498. The contrast of testimony from the porters and witnesses called 
by the Commission showed the stark racism embedded into the 
Commission’s order, highlighting the Fourteenth Amendment claim. While 
witnesses for the Commission stated they would more readily obey the 
authority of a white conductor over a black porter, the porters who took the 
stand—who were all experienced, educated, and respected in their 
communities—stated that asserting authority was not the way to effectively 
carry out their duties. Lauren Robel, Riding the Color Line: The Story of 
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., in Federal Courts 
Stories 163, 171–75 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds. 2010). 
21. Pullman Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 33 F. Supp. 675, 676 (W.D. Tex. 
1940) (three judge court). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 677–78. 
24. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. 
25. Id. at 499–500. 
26. Id. at 499. 
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tomorrow by a state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly 
promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus 
supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The 
resources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the 
waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature 
constitutional adjudication. . . . 
[Prior Supreme Court decisions] reflect a doctrine of abstention 
appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts, 
“exercising a wise discretion,” restrain their authority because of 
“scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state 
governments” and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary. 
This use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in 
furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal 
authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of 
those powers.27 
The Pullman doctrine was created as a response to a lack of guid-
ance from the Texas Supreme Court in an effort to harmonize the state 
and federal court systems.28 But under what circumstances should a fed-
eral court utilize the Pullman doctrine to abstain from deciding a case? 
First, it is worth pointing out that whether the state courts have 
heard the issue is irrelevant “when the unconstitutionality of the partic-
ular state action under challenge is clear.”29 In those circumstances, ab-
stention is unnecessary, even if the state courts have not been afforded 
the opportunity to address that particular issue. 
Furthermore, “abstention is not proper if the federal and state 
constitutional provisions are identical.”30 Abstention under Pullman 
was not intended “merely to await an attempt to vindicate the claim 
in a state court.”31 Courts have affirmed decisions to abstain, however, 
when the unclear law in question is unique to the state.32 
A companion to Pullman abstention is the England reservation, 
named for the case England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical 
 
27. Id. at 500–01 (citations omitted). 
28. Id. 
29. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
756 (1986). 
30. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 840 (7th ed. 2016). 
31. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971); see also Zwickler v. 
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 (1967) (“[A]bstention cannot be ordered simply to 
give state courts the first opportunity . . . .”). 
32. See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (noting that the Constitution 
of Alaska contained provisions regarding fish resources, and a challenge to a 
statute allegedly violating that provision was unique to the state of Alaska). 
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Examiners.33 While the majority opinion does not specifically mention 
Pullman, the case involved a group of chiropractors seeking an injunc-
tion against the Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, arguing 
that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by barring them from prac-
tice for failing to meet its educational requirements.34 The district court 
abstained because a determination that the statute in question did not 
apply to chiropractors could decide the entire case.35 The chiropractors 
returned to state court and ultimately lost on both the state and the 
federal issues in the Louisiana state-court system.36 When the chiro-
practors returned to federal court, the district court dismissed the case, 
indicating that the state court addressed all the issues—including the 
federal issue—and that they should have petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court instead of returning to the district court.37 
Following the district court’s dismissal, the chiropractors appealed 
their way up to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Brennan, writing for 
the Court, noted that “[t]here are fundamental objections to any con-
clusion that a litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a 
Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional claims can be 
compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to 
accept instead a state court’s determination of those claims.”38 The 
Court determined that following abstention, a party moving to state 
court has the choice of deciding where the federal claims will be liti-
gated.39 The party may choose to litigate the federal claim in the state 
court, which would extinguish the party’s right to return to the district 
court.40 Alternatively, the party may present the federal claim to the 
state court solely for context, while also explicitly reserving the right 
to return to the district court.41 In this event, the party’s right to return 
to the district court following the litigation of the state claim is 
 
33. 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
34. Id. at 412–13. 
35. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 180 F. Supp. 121, 124 (E.D. La. 
1960). 
36. The chiropractors lost in the Louisiana Court of Appeals, and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court denied their petition for review. England v. La. State Bd. of 
Med. Exam’rs, 126 So. 2d 51, 56–57 (La. Ct. App. 1960); England v. La. 
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. La. 1961). 
37. England, 194 F. Supp. at 522. 
38. England, 375 U.S. at 415. 
39. Id. at 418. 
40. Id. at 419. 
41. Id. at 421–22. 
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preserved, even if the state court decides on its own to rule on the 
merits of the federal claim.42 
B. Thibodaux Abstention for Unclear State Law with Diversity 
Jurisdiction 
As a general rule, courts do not abstain from hearing cases of un-
clear state law brought to federal court on diversity grounds.43 The 
Supreme Court carved out a notable exception, however, in the case of 
Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux.44 
In that case, the city of Thibodaux had recently expanded its 
boundaries and sought to condemn facilities of an electric company 
within the newly annexed territory.45 The city claimed authority under 
a state statute allowing Louisiana municipalities to expropriate utility 
service property in the public interest.46 While the city originally 
brought the case in Louisiana state court, Louisiana Power & Light 
Company, a Florida corporation, removed the case to the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.47 
The district court grappled with the concept that the statute 
granted eminent domain power to a subdivision of the state, noting 
that in those circumstances, “the extent to which it may be exercised 
is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in 
which the grant is contained.”48 The court also noted the seriousness of 
eminent domain, asserting that “the power of eminent domain is one of 
the attributes of sovereignty most fraught with the possibility of abuse 
and injustice.”49 Such gravity to the issue prompted the court to men-
tion that before recognizing the power of eminent domain, “[a] federal 
court . . . must make certain that that power has been granted by the 
state . . . .”50 
 
42. Id. at 421 (“[T]he litigant is in no event to be denied his right to return to 
the District Court unless it clearly appears that he voluntarily . . . fully 
litigated his federal claims in the state courts.”). 
43. Chemerinsky, supra note 30, at 844–45. 
44. 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
45. City of Thibodaux v. La. Power & Light Co., 153 F. Supp. 515, 516 (E.D. 
La. 1957). 
46. Id. at 516 n.2. 
47. Id. at 516 n.1. 
48. Id. at 517. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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Before the case came to the district court, no court—state or fed-
eral—had ever interpreted the statute at hand.51 The only authority the 
court was able to find on the issue was an opinion from the Louisiana 
Attorney General. The opinion was on an identical set of circumstances, 
but the lack of judicial interpretation “[gave the] court pause.”52 
The U.S. Supreme Court deemed the district court’s abstention 
from the case to be a proper use of its discretion.53 The Court affirmed 
abstention from ruling due to the state’s interest in its own eminent 
domain laws.54 As a result, federal courts could now abstain from judg-
ment in a diversity case when a decision on an unclear issue of state 
law would have an impact on a state interest affecting “sovereign pre-
rogative.”55 
C. Burford Abstention for Unclear State Law with Complex State 
Administrative Procedures 
Just two years after the Supreme Court created Pullman ab-
stention, the Court added a second, somewhat similar, doctrine called 
Burford abstention. Burford v. Sun Oil Company56 involved oil drilling 
in Texas, for which the state had created complex a state admin-
istration to handle decision-making on the subject.57 Burford began 
when the Texas Railroad Commission granted Burford a permit to drill 
four oil wells, and Sun brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Texas seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the 
order.58 The district court dismissed the case, and appeals eventually 
brought the case before the U.S. Supreme Court.59 The Court detailed 
the complexities of oil drilling in Texas, specifically noting that the field 
in question had “approximately nine hundred operators.”60 The Court 
also mentioned, as an example of the intricacy of the administrative 
system, the commission’s Rule 37, noting that “[i]t is estimated that 
over two-thirds of the wells in the East Texas field exist as exceptions 
to the rule, and since each exception may provoke a conflict among the 
interested par-ties, the volume of litigation arising from the admin-
 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959). 
54. See id. at 28. 
55. Id. 
56. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
57. Id. at 318–19. 
58. Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1941). 
59. Id. at 468, 470. 
60. Burford, 319 U.S. at 319. 
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istration of the rule is considerable.”61 The Supreme Court further spoke 
to the importance of having a unified body making these impactful 
decisions, and it ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision to 
dismiss the case.62 
A notable difference between Burford abstention and Pullman ab-
stention is that the former requires the court to dismiss the case, rather 
than to simply grant a stay of proceedings while the state issues are re-
solved.63 The Court subsequently expanded Burford abstention to dis-
miss cases containing both a strong local interest and the existence of 
a state-based regulatory system. This broad reading came from 
Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co.,64 which 
differed from Burford in that the Court—hearing a case involving the 
denial of a request to decommission two train lines for a lack of prof-
itability—focused more on the existence of a state regulatory procedure 
as opposed to the complexity of one.65 
This modification, however, has not been widely used by the Su-
preme Court in subsequent decisions. A few decades later, the Court 
walked this decision back a few steps and reaffirmed that any absten-
tion based upon a state regulatory system must be done only if a de-
cision would “disrupt the State’s attempt to ensure uniformity in the 
treatment of an essentially local problem.”66 The Court also made it 
clear that Burford abstention was only appropriate for cases demanding 
declaratory or equitable relief.67 
 
61. Id. at 324. 
62. Id. at 333–34. 
63. See id. at 334. 
64. 341 U.S. 341 (1951). 
65. See id. at 349–50. Despite agreeing with the overall result, Justice 
Frankfurter penned a highly critical concurrence, characterizing the case as 
a “flagrant contradiction” with stare decisis. Justice Frankfurter listed a 
number of cases, including Pullman and Burford, and believed the case at 
hand was distinguishable, writing that “the claim that is made here is within 
the easy grasp of federal judges, and certainly within the competence of three 
judges bred in Alabama law, with wide experience in its administration.” Id. 
at 360–62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
66. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Southern Railway Co., 
341 U.S. at 347). 
67. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (“Because 
this was a damages action, we conclude the District Court’s remand order 
was an unwarranted application of the Burford doctrine.”). 
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D. Younger Abstention to Avoid Interference with Pending State Court 
Proceedings 
The Court added a new doctrine in the 1970 case Younger v. 
Harris.68 John Harris brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California seeking an injunction against a state pros-
ecution because the California statute at issue violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.69 A three-judge panel struck down the statute 
as unconstitutional on its face.70 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court’s de-
cision granting the injunction.71 The Court noted that as a general rule, 
injunctions against pending state criminal prosecutions were not 
available.72 Justice Black, writing for the Court, mentioned that there 
could be exceptions to this general rule, but stated that “there is no 
point in our attempting now to specify what they might be.”73 Harris 
did not allege bad faith or indicate a pattern of harassment, so the 
Court did not find his arguments in favor of an injunction compelling.74 
More applicable to Harris, even a statute abridging First Amendment 
rights on its face is not enough to authorize an injunction.75 The Court 
did go on to say, however, that “[t]here may . . . be extraordinary cir-
cumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even 
in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment.”76 
The Younger doctrine serves a similar purpose to that of the Anti-
Injunction Act,77 but Younger was decided instead on the principles of 
equity and comity, and the Court explicitly stated that the Anti-
Injunction Act was not controlling in this situation.78 The Act itself is 
brief, stating “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction 
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by 
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to pro-
tect or effectuate its judgments.”79 
 
68. 401 U.S. 37 (1970). 
69. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 508–09 (C.D. Cal. 1968). 
70. Id. at 517. 
71. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. 
72. Id. at 53. 
73. Id. at 54. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 53. 
76. Id. 
77. Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012). 
78. 401 U.S. at 44, 54. 
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 
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It is not clear why the Court did not decide Younger on Anti-
Injunction Act grounds. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas stated 
the statute was “not a bar to a federal injunction under these circum-
stances.”80 Douglas took the viewpoint that a § 1983 claim seeking an 
injunction as an equitable remedy was an express authorization from 
Congress as required by the Anti-Injunction Act.81 The Court later 
agreed with this proposition in Mitchum v. Foster,82 acknowledging that 
a § 1983 claim is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, but also stat-
ing that Mitchum was the first case in which the Court could explicitly 
decide the question.83 It is possible that when Younger was decided a 
year earlier, the Court was not ready to decide the issue of whether § 
1983 fit within the Anti-Injunction Act’s exception, so it opted to rule 
on abstention grounds rather than statutory grounds.84 
The Younger doctrine began as a means to stop federal court 
interference in pending state criminal proceedings, but as it evolved, 
courts began abstaining from cases involving state-initiated civil pro-
ceedings as well. Addressing a nuisance claim in Huffman v. Pursue, 
Ltd.85—involving efforts to close an adult movie theater—the Court 
determined that the claim was more like a criminal case than other civil 
claims.86 The Huffman case involved the State of Ohio as a party to the 
proceeding, and criminal statutes were involved in the case.87 Two years 
later, the Court went on to clarify that Younger could be applied in 
any civil proceeding to which a state is a party.88 
The Court first dropped the necessity of the state as a party in 
Juidice v. Vail.89 In that case, the Court classified the core principle 
behind Younger as deference to the state courts generally as opposed 
 
80. 401 U.S. at 60 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
81. Id. at 62. 
82. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 
83. Id. at 226. 
84. See Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing 
Reconstruction, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1141, 1147 n.36 (1977) (“The Anti-
Injunction Act . . . was not available to Justice Black at the time of Younger 
because the Court had not resolved the relation between the Act and the 
Civil Rights Act.”). 
85. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
86. Id. at 604 (“[T]he proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal 
statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials.”). 
87. Id. 
88. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443–44 (1977). 
89. 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
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to some necessity tied to criminal proceedings.90 The Court indicated 
that an important state interest, be it criminal or civil, can be grounds 
for Younger abstention.91 The Court offered a qualification on its ruling, 
stating that Juidice did not answer the question of whether Younger 
can apply to all civil proceedings.92 
The Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Younger in the 
2013 case Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs.93 Reiterating the 
holding from a previous case, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. 
Council of the City of New Orleans,94 the Court affirmed three 
categories as being applicable to Younger abstention: “‘state criminal 
prosecutions,’ ‘civil enforcement proceedings,’ and ‘civil proceedings in-
volving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state 
courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’”95 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Ginsburg reversed the Eighth Circuit’s pro-abstention 
decision, emphasizing that the circumstances giving rise to Younger ab-
stention are “exceptional.”96 
E. Colorado River Abstention to Avoid Duplicative Proceedings 
Another abstention doctrine surfaced to address specific situations 
involving parallel litigation in the case of Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States.97 In Colorado River, the United 
States and Colorado residents became involved in a water dispute. The 
United States brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado seeking declaratory relief about the rights to the water.98 
Shortly thereafter, one of the defendants filed suit against the United 
States in state court over the same claims as the federal suit.99 
The Court first rejected the idea that the circumstances at play in 
Colorado River fit into any of the currently established abstention 
 
90. Id. at 334. 
91. Id. at 335. 
92. Id. at 336 n.13. In a harsh dissent, Justice Brennan considered the case 
“nothing less than plain refusal to enforce the congressional direction,” and 
he considered the Court’s aforementioned qualification irrelevant from a 
practical perspective. Id. at 345 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
93. 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013). 
94. 491 U.S. 350 (1989). 
95. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. at 588 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368). 
96. Id. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368). 
97. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
98. Id. at 805. 
99. Id. at 806. 
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doctrines.100 Despite this, the Court proclaimed that principles of judi-
cial efficiency sometimes create situations in which a court should ab-
stain.101 But while the Supreme Court showed some support for ab-
staining when proceedings in state court and federal court exist 
simultaneously for the same issue, it also declared that abstention 
should only be done in “exceptional circumstances.”102 In upholding the 
district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Court looked to many 
different aspects of the litigation, and found that the infancy of the fed-
eral proceeding,103 extensiveness of the state involvement,104 distance be-
tween the two courts,105 and the U.S. participation in the related state-
court proceedings weighed in favor of abstaining from the case.106 
The Colorado River Court outlined some factors to consider in ab-
staining due to parallel litigation: “the inconvenience of the federal 
forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the order 
in which jurisdiction was obtained . . . .”107 The Court determined that 
no single factor is determinative, and that “[o]nly the clearest of justifi-
cations will warrant dismissal.”108 
A few years later, the Court had the opportunity to clarify when 
Colorado River abstention should be invoked. The Court reaffirmed the 
holding in Colorado River and also stated that a federal court cannot 
abstain simply because parallel litigation exists. In Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation,109 a contrac-
tor petitioned the federal court to compel arbitration after a hospital 
brought suit in state court.110 In affirming the Court of Appeals’ reversal 
of a stay pending the outcome of the state proceeding, the Supreme 
Court also added factors to the Colorado River analysis: the source, 
either federal or state, of the law in question and the adequacy of the 
state-court proceedings to protect an individual’s rights.111 In that case, 
 
100. Id. at 813. 
101. Id. at 817. 
102. Id. at 813. 
103. Outside of the motion to dismiss giving rise to the appeal, the only other 
filing in the federal proceeding was the complaint. Id. at 820. 
104. The United States’ lawsuit was brought against 1,000 defendants. Id. 
105. The state court was located 300 miles away from the district court. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 818 (citations omitted). 
108. Id. at 818–19. 
109. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
110. Id. at 7. 
111. Id. at 23–27. 
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the Court also established that these factors are not a “mechanical 
checklist, but . . . a careful balancing of the important factors as they 
apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the 
exercise of jurisdiction.”112 The presence of a federal question was impor-
tant to the Court in ruling against abstention.113 
II. Abstention Facilitates Inefficiency 
Legal scholars have covered abstention from a variety of different 
angles.114 This Note will address abstention not from a theoretical per-
spective, but rather from a policy perspective. Here, the validity of the 
Court’s creation of the pertinent common law doctrines will be put 
aside in favor of addressing the tangible impact the use of these doc-
trines has. 
In practice, the different abstention doctrines create different prob-
lems with judicial inefficiency. These problems include an increased bur-
den on the litigants through cost and delay, a chilling effect on asserted 
rights, and a lack of clarity as to when the lower courts should abstain 
from a case. 
A. Abstention Places an Undue Burden on Litigants 
Litigation can be an arduous process. A case can take years after 
filing to be resolved, and it can generate substantial expenses in the 
process. In many instances, abstention increases these costs. 
Consider a situation in which a party brings a state claim and a 
federal claim in federal court. If the court decides to abstain through 
either a dismissal or a stay of proceedings, that order is immediately 
appealable.115 If the litigant is adamant on having his claim heard in 
 
112. Id. at 16. 
113. Id. at 26. 
114. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An 
Essay on the Distinction Between “Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory 
Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847 (2013); 
Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the 
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071 (1974); Martin H. 
Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial 
Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71 (1984); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985) (arguing that federal courts, 
following a set of principles of preference articulated by the author, should 
employ reasoned discretion when it comes to exercising jurisdiction in order 
to avoid overburdening themselves and unduly interfering with the states). 
115. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9–10 
(1983) (holding that an appeal to an abstention stay was proper because the 
stay order put the litigants “effectively out of court” (quoting Idlewild Bon 
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962))). 
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federal court, he must then bear the expense of appealing the decision 
in the federal courts. Should that not produce a favorable outcome, the 
litigant must then move to the state courts and pursue the case there. 
This could further include more appeals at the state level before poten-
tially allowing the litigant back into the federal court he chose in the 
first place. 
Much of the reasoning behind the “state law trio”116 of abstention 
doctrines stems from deference to the state court system by the federal 
court system.117 The idea is that the federal court should defer to the 
state court so that the issue can be decided correctly. It is debatable, 
however, whether abstention actually results in these issues being de-
cided correctly more often. The assumption here is that the state 
court—by nature of being the state court ruling on unclear issues of 
state law—is inherently more likely to be correct on the issue than a 
federal court could be.118 The error in this assumption is that “[t]he 
standard . . . refers to the highest court of the state.”119 In many ways, 
a lower state court decision has little more precedential weight than a 
ruling from the federal court. So is the resulting cost to the litigant 
justifiable in this instance? 
If one wants to argue that the state court has the right to take own-
ership of the issue, then maybe abstention is justified. The Pullman de-
cision cites avoiding “friction” as a motivating factor to abstain from 
ruling, but does not explain further.120 Federal courts often decide issues 
of state law, regardless of whether the state’s highest court has spoken 
on the issue.121 How much weight should we give to any inherent own-
ership right of the state courts? When the benefit is only slight, and 
the cost to the litigants is so great, the importance of preserving this 
 
116. The “state law trio” refers to Pullman, Burford, and Thibodaux, which all 
deal with some aspect of an unclear state law. 
117. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (“Few 
public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal 
chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies . . . .”). 
118. See Field, supra note 114, at 1091 (finding that abstention discussions 
frequently assume the state court will come to the correct decision on 
remand). 
119. Id. 
120. 312 U.S. at 500. 
121. See, e.g., Blankenship v. USA Truck, Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(“When there is no state supreme court case directly on point, our role is to 
predict how the state supreme court would rule if faced with the [same issue] 
before us.” (quoting Northland Cas. Co. v. Meeks, 540 F.3d 869, 874 (8th 
Cir. 2008))); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 
1086 (3d Cir. 1980) (“New Jersey has not taken a position on this question, 
so . . . we must predict which view the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
adopt . . . .”). 
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deference to the state courts lessens. Judith Kaye, former Chief Judge 
of the New York Court of Appeals, recognized the delay and expense 
caused by abstention, and concluded that “it soon became apparent 
that abstention was not an effective solution to the problem of federal 
courts seeking to ascertain state law.”122 
B. Abstention Can Have a Chilling Effect on Individual Rights 
Grand Juror Doe filed suit in federal court because she wanted to 
exercise what she believed to be her rights under the First Amend-
ment.123 With litigation having carried on for over a year, and pro-
ceedings still ongoing, has the need to go through so much effectively 
chilled free speech? 
The Supreme Court has considered the possibility that delayed res-
olution of cases involving constitutional challenges could produce this 
undesirable result.124 Despite this, the Court has not provided a defin-
itive answer on the appropriate action in those circumstances, although 
it did note that it has “been particularly reluctant to abstain in cases 
involving facial challenges based on the First Amendment.”125 Still, 
given both the financial and mental cost of prolonged litigation, it is 
not surprising that some litigants would view an entirely new set of 
proceedings brought about by abstention as a motivating factor in 
dropping their claims. 
C. Lower Courts Are Not Clear on When to Apply Abstention 
No matter what goals one thinks abstention should achieve, the 
lower courts’ ability to fulfill those objectives can work only as long as 
they understand when to abstain and when not to abstain from hearing 
a case. Some doctrines have been clearer than others, but abstention as 
a whole could benefit from codification in order to provide lower federal 
courts with a clear directive as to the circumstances that warrant 
abstaining. 
In Grand Juror Doe’s case, the federal district court originally ab-
stained under Burford and Pullman, and it dismissed her entire case.126 
 
122. Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: 
Certified Questions in New York, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 373, 380 (2000). 
123. See supra notes 2–9 and accompanying text. 
124. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967) (“[T]o force the plaintiff who 
has commenced a federal action to suffer the delay of state court proceedings 
might itself effect the impermissible chilling of the very constitutional right 
he seeks to protect.”). 
125. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987). 
126. Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2016). The district court’s 
usage of Burford as the driving force of its decision is peculiar. Not only was 
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On appeal, Grand Juror Doe argued that Burford abstention was 
inappropriate while also noting that the court should have retained 
jurisdiction if abstaining under Pullman.127 Grand Juror Doe crafted her 
briefs and oral argument to the Eighth Circuit so as to carefully avoid 
asserting a claim under state law, instead choosing to focus on whether 
the district court erred in relying on Burford and dismissing the case.128 
Despite this, the Eighth Circuit—possibly treating the slight nudge 
towards the use of Pullman abstention over Burford as an implied argu-
ment for a state claim that would obviate a federal decision—extrap-
olated Grand Juror Doe’s argument into “whether and to what extent 
the [grand jury secrecy] statute applies to her.”129 In a sense, the district 
court’s confusion over which abstention doctrine to apply led to Grand 
Juror Doe being forced to argue in favor of moving her case out of 
federal court temporarily pursuant to Pullman, because the alter-
native—the court abstaining under Burford and dismissing the case—
would shut her out of federal court until a potential Supreme Court 
review of the Missouri Supreme Court. 
It is not always clear whether abstention is discretionary or manda-
tory. The Supreme Court has seemingly ruled in both directions, 
although more recent decisions tend to support the doctrine as dis-
cretionary.130 Furthermore, where a statute creates exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, it is unclear if abstention is proper. The Fifth Circuit has 
deemed that it is not.131 Although the Supreme Court declined to review 
 
abstaining under Burford wholly inappropriate given the circumstances, but 
neither party cited the case in the numerous briefs on the issue. 
127. Brief of Appellant at 27–33, Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(No. 15-2667). 
128. Id. at 33–36; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, 19, Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 
785 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2667); Oral Argument at 00:00–12:15, 28:38–
31:28, Doe v. McCulloch, 835 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2667), 
http://media-oa.ca8.uscourts.gov/OAaudio/2016/3/152667.MP3. 
129. McCulloch, 835 F.3d at 788. 
130. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727–28 (1996) (“[T]he 
power to dismiss under the Burford doctrine, as with other abstention 
doctrines, . . . derives from the discretion historically enjoyed by courts of 
equity.”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964) (“The abstention 
doctrine is not an automatic rule . . . ; it rather involves a discretionary 
exercise . . . .”); City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 
640 (1959) (“Proper exercise of federal jurisdiction requires that 
controversies involving unsettled questions of state law be decided in the 
state tribunals preliminary to a federal court’s consideration of the 
underlying federal constitutional questions.” (emphasis added)). 
131. Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1059 (5th Cir. 1980) (“When Congress has 
directed . . . that [federal courts] have exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . , abstention . . . defeats the purpose of that legislation.”). 
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the Fifth Circuit case establishing that opinion, at least one member of 
the Court likely supports that viewpoint.132 
The uncertainty surrounding abstention has created circuit splits 
with regard to Pullman and its requirements. The Second, Third, Sixth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits utilize a three-part test to determine if 
Pullman abstention is appropriate.133 This test has generally considered 
the level of uncertainty in the state-law issue, how much an interpre-
tation of the state law could affect the federal law outcome, and whether 
an interpretation of the state law could obviate or change the federal 
constitutional issue.134 In the Fifth Circuit, however, the parts of the 
three-part test are considered factors, and only one is necessary to allow 
abstention.135 This only becomes more uncertain when dealing with 
Thibodaux abstention in diversity cases.136 Unsurprisingly, lower court 
disagreement has carried over into Burford abstention as well.137 Clarity 
appears to resume—at least in comparison—when looking to lower 
court interpretations of Younger and Colorado River abstention, but 
 
132. See Key v. Wise, 454 U.S. 1103, 1109 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“When Congress speaks definitively, . . . state courts may not act to 
obstruct or unsettle the congressional design.”). 
133. Burdick v. Takushi, 846 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1988) (reformulating the 
second part of the test enunciated in McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 
761 (2d Cir. 1976), to require consideration of sensitive social policy issues 
typically reserved for state courts); Vinyard v. King, 655 F.2d 1016, 1018 
(10th Cir. 1981) (quoting the three-part test formulated in D’Iorio v. Cty. 
of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir. 1978)); Record Revolution No. 6, 
Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 925 (6th Cir. 1980) (combining the 
Second Circuit’s second and third factors, and adding a consideration of the 
federal decision’s potential for interference with “important state policies or 
regulatory programs”). 
134. McRedmond, 533 F.2d at 761; see also supra note 133 (citing cases 
supporting a three-part test for Pullman abstention with only slight 
differences in wording). 
135. Mireles v. Crosby Cty., 724 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1984). 
136. Compare United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 484–85 (5th 
Cir. 1964) (en banc) (abstaining in a diversity case solely because the state 
law was unclear), with Miller-Davis Co. v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 567 
F.2d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding abstention in a diversity case 
inappropriate, noting that an England reservation would be impossible in a 
diversity situation). 
137. See Neufeld v. City of Baltimore, 964 F.2d 347, 349–51 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(noting the Supreme Court’s lack of a “hard-and-fast rule” from Burford and 
that the federal ruling in the instant case would not disrupt a state policy); 
see also Charles S. Treat, Comment, Abstention by Federal Courts in Suits 
Challenging State Administrative Decisions: The Scope of the Burford 
Doctrine, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 971, 980–88 (1979) (discussing examples of 
the “considerable confusion” among lower courts in applying Burford). 
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even then, the clarity achieved through courts developing tests and lists 
of factors is undercut by the lack of uniformity.138 
Even outside the merits and procedural elements, Grand Juror 
Doe’s case indicates the uncertainty of abstention. Judge Roger 
Wollman wrote the opinion for the Eighth Circuit in both Doe v. 
McCulloch and Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs,139 the latter of 
which was a Younger abstention case that was reversed by the Supreme 
Court.140 At oral argument in Doe, Judge Wollman quipped that he was 
“still smarting in a way from the unanimous decision that over-
ruled . . . one of [his] opinions in the Sprint case.”141 Wollman continued 
to joke that the Supreme Court “had to rub it in” when explaining the 
ruling, characterizing the Court as saying, “dumb-dumb can’t you read 
our cases?”142 
D. Current Mechanisms Are Inadequate 
Two major procedures are typically discussed in conjunction with 
abstention. These procedures are England reservations and certified 
questions. An England reservation is meant to ensure that a plaintiff 
continues to hold access to her chosen forum, but this access can still 
be delayed until the plaintiff has traversed the entire state court pro-
cess.143 When returning to state court in Missouri, Grand Juror Doe ex-
plicitly made an England reservation, indicating her intention to return 
to the federal district court.144 In order to comply with England, Grand 
Juror Doe asserted her federal claim with the caveat that she was only 
providing context for the case.145 
Despite Grand Juror Doe’s England reservation, the Missouri state 
court proceeded to rule on the merits of her First Amendment claim, 
 
138. See Tyler A. Mamone, Comment, No Simple Compromise: Reconciling Duty 
and Discretion Under Colorado River Abstention in Claims for Mixed Relief, 
45 U. Tol. L. Rev. 347, 359 (2014) (“Circuits reviewing these cases are 
forced to navigate the often confusing and less-than-uniform exceptional 
circumstances test.”). 
139. 690 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012). 
140. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593–94 (2013). 
141. Oral Argument, supra note 128, at 25:57.  
142. Id. at 26:05–26:19. 
143. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure 
outlined in England). 
144. Petition for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Doe v. McCulloch, No. 
15SL-CC01891 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2016). 
145. Id. at 10–11, 11 n.3 (“Plaintiff does not seek relief on Count I from this 
Court. Count I is set forth here for the sole purpose of allowing this Court 
to construe the relevant statutes against a backdrop of Plaintiff’s federal 
constitutional challenge.”). 
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making no mention of her request not to litigate the issue in that 
forum.146 The Missouri Court of Appeals addressed Doe’s England reser-
vation head on, stating that because a freedom of speech claim would 
be resolved identically under the Missouri Constitution and the United 
States Constitution, the trial court was correct to ignore the England 
reservation and reach the merits of Doe’s federal issue.147 In these situ-
ations, the England reservation preserves the ability of a litigant to 
return to the federal district court, but “issue preclusion generally binds 
an abstaining federal court to those state court findings that are nec-
essary to the state court’s holding . . . .”148 So while the England reser-
vation serves an important function in preserving the litigant’s rights, 
it can sometimes be seen as doing too little, too late—or preclude addi-
tional litigation entirely—should a state court ignore a litigant’s plea 
for separation of the federal and state issues, or when such separation 
is impracticable. 
A certified question can be used to clarify an unclear law; it is a 
process by which a federal court presents a question of law to a state 
supreme court.149 Individual states have adopted certified question laws, 
and the Supreme Court has supported states’ efforts to help “build a 
cooperative judicial federalism.”150 A judge on the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit made much less flattering remarks about 
them.151 
Certified questions are, on their face, an innovative concept that 
theoretically solves many abstention-related problems. They suffer, 
however, from the lack of uniformity across the states. This is seen from 
the perspective of both timeliness and quality of the answer. 
Unfortunately, certified questions will only help expedite a case so long 
as the highest court in the state answering the question is willing to 
cooperate. 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
drafted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act to serve as 
a recommendation for states interested in adopting the certified 
 
146. Doe v. McCulloch, No. 15SL-CC01891, slip op. at 12–13 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 
13, 2016), aff’d, No. ED105181 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017). 
147. Doe v. McCulloch, No. ED105181, slip op. at 8–10 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 
2017), motion for transfer to Supreme Court filed, No. SC96950 (Mo. Feb. 
13, 2018). 
148. Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional 
Adjudication, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1869, 1892 (2008). 
149. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . . , 29 Suffolk 
U. L. Rev. 677, 678 (1995). 
150. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). 
151. Selya, supra note 149, at 681 (“[T]he beauty of certification, like the beauty 
that Hollywood cherishes, is only skin-deep . . . .”). 
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question procedure.152 Variation still exists, however, between the pro-
cedures eventually adopted by the states.153 This variation takes the 
form of different standards for posing a question to the state court, and 
which courts are permitted to issue question to the state court.154 
Access tends to be the first bar to a successful certified question. 
The highest court in some states will outright refuse to hear a question 
posed by certain courts.155 The certified question procedure has gained 
popularity in the country over the years, but still has not reached every 
state.156 North Carolina’s lack of a certified question process is especially 
notable when considering that every other state in the country, the 
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands all have at least some variation on this procedure in place.157 
Even if every jurisdiction implements a certified question procedure, 
the variation in courts allowed to present such a question means a liti-
gant’s ability to have her case fully decided in the federal forum of her 
choice could be at the mercy of a state supreme court’s policy on the 
procedure. 
Even when access itself is not an issue to presenting a certified 
question, variation still exists on the quality of the response to the ques-
tion. The highest court in New York has been open to certification, 
even reframing the question to “make [it] more readily answerable[,] 
 
152. Unif. Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule] (Nat’l 
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1995). 
153. See Gregory L. Acquaviva, The Certification of Unsettled Questions of State 
Law to State High Courts: The Third Circuit’s Experience, 115 Penn St. 
L. Rev. 377, 392 n.107 (2010) (contrasting the level of clarity between the 
highest courts in New York and New Jersey in answers to certified 
questions). 
154. See id. at 398–99 (comparing Pennsylvania’s enumerated standards for 
posing certified questions with New Jersey’s lack of standards, with 
Pennsylvania allowing any Court of Appeals to certify a question as opposed 
to New Jersey only allowing questions from the Third Circuit); see also id. 
at 403–04 (noting Delaware’s broad acceptance of certified questions from 
any federal court at the appeals or district level, along with the highest 
appellate court in any state, and any Delaware court). 
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (illustrating variation in 
acceptable certifying courts for Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware). 
156. Acquaviva, supra note 153, at 383–85 (noting that only four states had a 
certified question procedure in 1967, but now only North Carolina lacks such 
a process). 
157. Michael Klotz, Note, Avoiding Inconsistent Interpretations: United States v. 
Kelly, the Fourth Circuit, and the Need for a Certification Procedure in 
North Carolina, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1173, 1175 (2014). North 
Carolina has introduced a bill for the 2017 session that would implement a 
procedure for certified questions. H.B. 157, Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (N.C. 
2017). 
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and . . . remov[ing] . . . other obstacles that may not have been apparent 
at the time of certification.”158 The court has similarly made an effort 
to answer the question as completely as possible, even when that per-
tains to issues not explicitly presented in the question.159 New York has 
also done well to consider timeliness when answering questions, at one 
point holding an average initial response time—whether the court will 
accept or reject the question—of six weeks and answer production in 
six months.160 
While New York may exemplify some of the more beneficial aspects 
of certification, other courts illustrate how a lack of uniformity in the 
process creates disparate outcomes for litigants in different parts of the 
country.161 The Michigan Supreme Court has been characterized as, “to 
say the least, . . . not very receptive to the certified question.”162 The 
court has often declined to answer certified questions, refused to state 
the reasons for not answering, and has been “even more hostile” to 
questions presented by federal district courts.163 In a recent answer to a 
certified question, Chief Justice Young began his concurring opinion by 
clarifying that he wrote “only to explain why, given my longstanding 
views on the questionable constitutionality of responding to certified 
questions from federal courts, I choose to participate in responding to 
the instant certified question.”164 Young’s opinion is that the court 
should only answer certified questions “when the Michigan legal issue 
 
158. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 122, at 420. 
159. Id. at 420–21. 
160. Id. at 397. 
161. It is worth noting that while New York’s response quality and timeliness are 
laudable, the state does not allow for questions to be posed from federal 
district courts. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27(a) (2016). 
162. M. Bryan Schneider, Note, “But Answer Came There None”: The Michigan 
Supreme Court and the Certified Question of State Law, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 
273, 315 (1994). 
163. Id. at 315–17. 
164. Deacon v. Pandora Media, Inc. (In re Certified Question from the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit), 885 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Mich. 2016) (Young, 
C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Young does bring up a valid concern about 
the constitutionality of certified questions. Given that many states have 
constitutions modeled after the U.S. Constitution, certified questions could 
run afoul of the prohibition against advisory opinions. For a discussion of 
the constitutionality of certified questions, using Michigan’s constitution as 
an example, see Schneider, supra note 162, at 308–12. 
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is a debatable one and pivotal to the federal case that prompted the re-
quest for the certified question.”165 
Timeliness lies at the crux of easing the burden on litigants, and 
state courts vary in their ability to satisfy that element through certi-
fied questions. Judge Bruce Selya of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit noted that after certifying a question to the 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, the court did not respond until years 
later and stated that it would not be answering the question.166 While 
this incident lies on the extreme side, it is not an uncommon occur-
rence.167 
The mechanisms currently in place—England reservations and cer-
tified questions—both do well in an ideal world. An England reservation 
can ensure that the right to return to a federal district court is pro-
tected, but protecting against the additional burdens of abstention is 
beyond the scope of the mechanism. Certified questions have the po-
tential to help ease the burden on litigants significantly, but its useful-
ness is largely controlled by the state courts, and it suffers from a lack 
of uniformity to be a conclusive answer to the difficulties abstention 
creates. 
III. Solutions and Consequences to Changes in 
Abstention 
The purpose of these solutions is to create a system that works as 
efficiently as possible while deferring as much as possible to the plain-
tiff’s choice of the federal forum. To the extent that any proposed 
changes to the current system are ambiguous in their application to a 
case, the preference should be to allow the litigant to remain in federal 
court. 
This Note aims to codify only certain aspects of the current 
abstention doctrines. Generally, the proposal is to alter the require-
ments for when Pullman and Burford abstention can be invoked, to 
abolish the practice of Thibodaux and Younger abstention entirely, and 
to make Colorado River abstention more easily invoked. 
 
165. Deacon, 855 N.W.2d at 634 (quoting M.M. v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r (In re 
Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mich.), 825 
N.W.2d 566, 573 (Mich. 2012) (Young, C.J., dissenting)). 
166. Selya, supra note 149, at 681. 
167. See id. at 681 n.18 (noting that delay is the biggest problem in the procedure 
and collecting cases in which the state court delayed answering certified 
questions by a range of thirteen months to six years). 
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A. Expand the Use of Certified Questions 
Certified questions are a source of untapped potential. While in 
some jurisdictions the process works quite well, it suffers from a lack of 
uniformity across the country.168 Since this is still largely a state-con-
trolled mechanism, there is only so much that can be done, but adding 
federal guidelines built around the notion of certified questions can 
allow for federal courts to maneuver with greater ease regardless of a 
given state’s disposition on the subject.169 
To account for differences in various state statutes and rules gov-
erning certified questions, a federal statute covering certified questions 
can give a federal court options when a state does not provide specific 
protections. The first step would be to introduce a provision that leads 
the federal courts away from abstention in favor of certified questions 
where available. This provision would bar the courts from abstaining 
from a case when a certified question would otherwise resolve the issue. 
The next consideration would be the timing of the answer to the 
question. New York prided itself on being able to answer questions in 
an average time of six months.170 Pennsylvania requires all questions be 
resolved within sixty days.171 California does not specify a time for an-
swering certified questions, but the California Constitution suspends 
the salary of any judge before whom a question remains pending for 
ninety days after being submitted for decision, although this does not 
account for the amount of time it takes from certification to submis-
sion.172 To ensure uniformity over timing, the proposed legislation will 
include a provision requiring the federal court to withdraw the question 
if an answer has not been produced within six months. This would give 
the state court adequate time to respond, but also protect litigants from 
having to postpone their cases for longer than necessary to reasonably 
allow the state to be heard on the issue. 
Should the state court decline to answer the question, the federal 
court would continue to move forward with the case. If the state court 
decides it does not want to answer the question, the federal court can 
treat that non-response as implied approval for a federal decision on 
 
168. See id. at 681. 
169. As a theoretical exercise, Judge Selya opined on Congressional action 
requiring state courts to accept and answer certified questions. Aside from 
constitutional concerns, Judge Selya noted that such a one-way provision 
would never work, as “cooperative judicial federalism cannot be force-fed to 
the states without destroying both the spirit and the utility of the practice.” 
Id. at 684. 
170. Kaye & Weissman, supra note 122, at 397. 
171. Pa. Sup. Ct. Internal Operating P. § 8(B). 
172. Cal. R. Ct. 8.548; Cal. Const. art. VI, § 19. 
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the state law issue. In many cases regarding Pullman and Burford ab-
stention, this process could essentially obviate their use. 
This provision could, first and foremost, pose a great risk of the 
“friction” that the Pullman Court warned about.173 While this could po-
tentially be a step forward for efficient litigation in federal courts, it 
would undoubtedly impose burdens on the highest courts in each state. 
Increasing the number of questions posed to the state courts could lead 
to the state courts simply declining to answer the questions, especially 
if this process begins to erode cooperative federalism in the courts. 
A more optimistic look on the provision is that the state courts can 
utilize truncated proceedings to exercise more control over how the fed-
eral courts interpret unsettled areas of law. Should state courts look to 
the provision as an opportunity, the consequences would rise above 
adding more work without increased results. Should the state court look 
to the provision as an insult,174 at least the uniform timing would pre-
vent the litigant from being too negatively impacted by a long delay.175 
A compromise, if necessary, could be to allow the state courts, in their 
response, to decline to answer while simultaneously requesting absten-
tion from the federal courts.176 
Ultimately, a federal provision on certified questions would ideally 
solve the problem of the lack of uniformity and ease the burden of pro-
longed litigation, while it would also allow the state courts a mechanism 
by which they can influence the interpretation of their own laws. It 
would take good faith from all involved in order to work, but it gives 
all parties something to gain. Certified questions as currently used are, 
 
173. While this Note takes the position that communication and collaboration—
principles with which this proposed legislation was designed—promote 
harmony between the state and federal courts, this may not be a widely 
accepted position. See Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 114, 162 (2009) (“[S]tate courts have the power and duty to address 
federal questions . . . . When a state court answers a certified question, 
however, it has been deprived of this power.”). 
174. See id. at 166 (“Federal judges confronted with an open and challenging 
question of state law should see the case as a reason for harder work and 
deeper thought, not quitting the field. The alternative is not comity, but 
disrespect for states . . . .”). This Note agrees with Professor Long that 
federal judges should be inclined to tackle unanswered questions, even if they 
pertain to state issues, but further argues that certified questions are much 
better suited than abstention in the rare circumstances outlined above. 
175. Judge Selya’s two-to-three-year wait time to hear that the Supreme Court 
of Puerto Rico will be declining to answer the certified question is completely 
unacceptable. See Selya, supra note 149, at 681. 
176. Whether the federal court grants the request is the first in a potentially long 
series of questions about this approach, but this Note takes the stance that 
cooperative federalism can be made stronger through communication. 
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at least on a national level, underutilized, and an improvement can do 
well to reconcile the various policy goals at play. 
B. Additional Requirements for Pullman and Burford Abstention 
Notwithstanding the previous Section, the Pullman Court’s 
“friction” rationale is, at best, too abstract. While there can be some 
benefit to state supreme courts being the first to interpret the laws of 
their jurisdictions, the fact that a predictive federal court ruling could 
one day be displaced by a state supreme court ruling is a concern out-
weighed by the cost to litigants. And while the Court has anchored 
Burford abstention to a more predictable set of circumstances, it should 
be interpreted more narrowly to reduce the transaction costs that fur-
ther litigation would entail. 
Even if the use of certified questions is expanded, changing state 
laws individually is not an effective option.177 Thus, the proposals in 
Part III.A must deal with the reality that not all state courts accept 
certified questions from federal district courts. Thus, the proposed legis-
lation requires contingencies for instances in which certified questions 
are not possible. 
Rather than putting the focus of Pullman and Burford on how 
unclear a state law may be or how complex a state regulatory system 
may be, the focus should fall onto the possible outcome. The federal 
district judge should abstain from ruling on the case only if the state’s 
interest in hearing the case first is both overwhelmingly strong and a 
decision on the state-law issue will have a unique impact on the state.178 
While somewhat subjective in nature, this is meant as an extremely 
high bar to act as a general deterrent against the use of abstention in 
these circumstances. This should be discretionary for the judge, and an 
appellate court can review the decision for abuse of discretion. While 
determining whether to abstain or hear the case, a federal district judge 
should always analyze the situation with a weight already placed on 
the side of not abstaining.179 
The general aim of this proposal is to promote leaving the case 
within federal jurisdiction. Possible consequences could be abuse of dis-
cretion by district judges, as they could abstain for subjective reasons. 
 
177. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
178. While this language is purposely vague, the circumstances in Reetz v. 
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), come to mind as a proper use of abstention 
for this reason. Because of the unique and powerful impact commercial 
salmon fishing has on Alaska and its residents, abstaining to allow Alaska a 
chance to shape the issue moving forward was the correct decision. Id. at 
86–87. 
179. In the event that a state’s highest court requests abstention in a certified 
question response, the weight should instead be placed on the side of 
abstaining. 
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An appeal on a decision to abstain or to not abstain would increase liti-
gation costs, but at least with this method the costs are being expended 
in the litigant’s original choice of forum. 
Another danger to raising the bar for Pullman and Burford 
abstention is forum shopping. If federal courts in a given state are com-
ing to different conclusions on important questions of state law, liti-
gants may try to use this to their advantage when bringing suit.180 This 
could be counteracted on appeal, which would generally open the door 
to posing a certified question to the state court. So even if forum shop-
ping begins to take place, the state would have the motive and oppor-
tunity to address the issue through the certified question procedure. 
C. Abolish Thibodaux and Younger Completely 
To the extent that the proposed solutions do not cover everything, 
it is preferable that the lower courts not abstain when they should 
rather than abstain when they should not. Therefore, to the extent that 
abolishing Thibodaux and Younger brings more litigants to federal 
courts than there otherwise should be, that is considered a feature, not 
a bug. 
While this Note is focused more on the practical effects of absten-
tion than on its source of power, it is worth noting that in his separation 
of powers argument, Martin Redish wrote that Thibodaux abstention is 
“[b]y far [one of] the least justifiable forms of abstention.”181 Because 
Thibodaux directly contradicts a congressional statute giving jurisdic-
tion in diversity cases, and because diversity jurisdiction was designed 
to avoid out-of-state bias, it should no longer be used.182 
Younger is peculiar because of its relationship with the Anti-
Injunction Act, both being mechanisms for prohibiting the injunction 
of a state court proceeding in certain circumstances.183 Since the Anti-
Injunction Act covers many of the same dangers against which Younger 
tries to protect, the Anti-Injunction Act can pick up a significant 
 
180. The extent to which modifying abstention may influence the viability of 
forum shopping may necessarily be undesired, at least within the larger 
context of current norms. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a 
Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 267, 
291 (1996) (“There are no uniform opinions on the acceptability of filing 
lawsuits in given venues in order to obtain more favorable laws or more 
favorable juries. But the overwhelming majority of decisions accepts these 
two types of forum-shopping as legitimate tactical maneuvers.”). 
181. Redish, supra note 114, at 98. 
182. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“Diversity jurisdiction is 
founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from 
susceptibility to potential local bias.”). 
183. See supra Part I.D (discussing Younger and its relationship with the Anti-
Injunction Act). 
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amount of slack should Younger abstention no longer exist. And again, 
to the extent that this leads more litigants to remain in federal court, 
that is not considered troublesome. 
D. Expand Colorado River Abstention 
Courts should feel more empowered to abstain based on Colorado 
River abstention. While this may appear odd, given the largely anti-
abstention sentiment conveyed thus far, Colorado River provides the 
courts, both state and federal, with an opportunity to avoid the redun-
dant practice of working through the same issues more than once, or to 
avoid working through multiple issues in separate forums all at once.184 
A strict first-in-time rule may be on the extreme side, but it should 
be one of the most important factors in considering whether the court 
should abstain. The Supreme Court has since expanded on its initial 
factors for Colorado River abstention, and that provides a good starting 
point for codification. Essentially, if there are two cases on the same 
issue occurring simultaneously, a federal court should give serious con-
sideration to abstention. So long as the litigants can be afforded an 
adequate forum—which should not be a problem within the United 
States185—a reduction of judicial waste should take precedence. While 
the current system urges Colorado River abstention in only the clearest 
cases, this ought to be changed in order to allow federal courts more 
freedom to take measures to ease the burden on litigants. 
IV. Proposed Abstention Law 
1. A federal court may abstain from hearing a case arising under 
federal law when: 
(A) The case contains an issue of state law on which no 
definitive guidance can be found from the state’s highest court, 
and: 
(1) The state does not allow the federal court to pose 
a certified question of law; 
(2) A reasonable construction of the issue of state law 
would render deciding a constitutional issue 
unnecessary; 
 
184. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983) 
(“There is no force here to the consideration that was paramount in Colorado 
River itself—the danger of piecemeal litigation.”). 
185. Forum adequacy is typically an analysis by U.S. courts of foreign judiciaries, 
not domestic. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke 
Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1444, 1460 (2011). 
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(3) The state’s interest in deciding the issue in its own 
judicial system is strong; and 
(4) The issue has a unique impact on the state. 
(B) The case exists alongside a parallel state court proceeding, 
and after balancing the following factors, with an extra weight 
added to abstention, abstaining would promote judicial 
economy in an adequate forum: 
(1) Which forum first claimed jurisdiction; 
(2) Relative progress made in each proceeding; 
(3) Inconvenience of the forum; 
(4) Desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; 
(5) Source of the law in question. 
2. A federal court may certify a question of law to a state’s highest 
court when: 
(A) The state has a certified question procedure; and 
(B) The case contains an issue of state law on which no 
definitive guidance can be found from the state’s highest court; 
but 
(C) The federal court must withdraw the question and resume 
proceedings if the state does not respond within six months. 
Conclusion 
While abstention involves several competing interests, paramount 
among them should be a reduction in judicial waste with the cost to 
the litigants kept in mind. The courts have thus far used abstention in 
a manner that solves only a few problems, if any, while significantly in-
creasing the cost to the individuals involved in the case. In some circum-
stances, this may only be a monetary burden, but in other cases, like 
that of Grand Juror Doe, current abstention policy can have the effect 
of chilling free speech and nullifying an individual’s desire to exercise 
his or her constitutional rights. 
Ultimately, creating a better use of abstention is difficult given the 
elements of federalism at play between the federal and state court sys-
tems. While this proposed legislation can only make an impact on the 
federal side of this issue, it is drafted with the goal of ensuring efficient 
litigation in an adequate forum, doing its best to ensure the plaintiff’s 
choice of venue. Reforming abstention doctrines into a federal law not 
only promotes a more streamlined judicial system, but it also gives more 
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clarity to judges confronted with these situations. Both outcomes hope-
fully work to create a more efficient judicial system for those who choose 
to utilize it. 
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